Trump’s third way on Iran: who else pays the price? Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates can route part of their energy exports around Hormuz; Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain have fewer alternatives. Thursday 12/11/2026 Maryam Faghih Imani Washington may view sustained economic pressure as a less costly alternative to another military offensive against the Iranian government. For the Gulf states, the calculation is more complicated. Their economies are recovering from war-related disruption, and avoiding new American strikes does not necessarily restore the certainty needed for trade and investment. According to Axios, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told G7 counterparts that President Donald Trump had, for now, chosen a third course: neither renewed military action nor a negotiated settlement, but continued sanctions and a naval blockade aimed at pressuring Tehran. The approach keeps leverage on the Iranian government without the immediate risks of another large-scale offensive. Yet its economic consequences do not stop at Iran’s borders. Ordinary Iranians, already burdened by war and economic hardship, may face further pressure on jobs, prices and household finances as restrictions persist. The Gulf’s economic bill is already substantial. In a November 9 assessment, Allianz forecast a combined 4 percent contraction in the six Gulf Cooperation Council economies in 2026, estimated $200 billion in reconstruction needs and projected a $790 billion shortfall in output from 2026 to 2030 relative to a prewar trajectory. These figures measure different things: the last is a forecast, not losses already realised, and none should be added together. Corporate disclosures put those regional estimates into perspective. Following strikes by Iranian forces on Ras Laffan, QatarEnergy said 17 percent of Qatar’s liquefied natural gas export capacity had been disabled, with potential annual revenue losses of about $20 billion. Emirates Group reported a 66 percent drop in profit after tax for April through September and a 12 percent decline in revenue from a year earlier. It remained profitable, reflecting both the costs of disruption and the ability of established Gulf businesses to adapt. Costs also reach beyond damaged facilities. Airlines, hotels and logistics operators depend on reliable connections. Allianz estimates that tourist flows to the Gulf states fell 22 percent in the first half of 2026. In July, insurance broker Marsh reported war-risk premiums for certain Strait of Hormuz crossings at 7.5 to 10 percent of vessel value. Those rates were not universal or permanent, but they illustrate how insecurity raises the price of commerce. The risk has not vanished. Reuters reported 37 attacks on vessels in and around Hormuz in October, even as liquefied gas traffic recovered. Further strikes by Iranian forces, or renewed escalation by either side, could complicate the return to normal shipping through the Gulf. Sanctions are not missiles, and a prolonged economic campaign need not produce the same destruction as another war. But a maritime blockade operating beside vital trade routes can sustain uncertainty for countries that depend on them. A less visible cost is the need to rethink investment priorities. Allianz projects $380 billion to $400 billion in new spending commitments as Gulf governments accelerate alternative export corridors, power networks, water systems, transport, defence and data centres. Some projects were already planned, and much of this spending could strengthen long-term competitiveness. Yet resources devoted to protecting infrastructure are resources that cannot all be allocated to other development ambitions. The war is influencing not only what Gulf economies build, but when. Financing this transition presents strategic choices for governments with considerable reserves and borrowing capacity. Allianz projects cumulative Gulf government deficits of $475 billion through 2030 and $301 billion in new borrowing requirements, alongside the use of reserves and other financing. The question is how to deploy these resources while maintaining momentum behind economic diversification. Nor do all Gulf states face identical conditions. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates can route part of their energy exports around Hormuz; Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain have fewer alternatives. Oman has gained opportunities as an alternative trading gateway. Some producers benefit from higher crude prices: Aramco reported a 9 percent year-on-year rise in adjusted third-quarter net income to $31.2 billion. These differences matter, as do the substantial resources Gulf governments are deploying to manage the consequences. Diplomacy is another expression of that agency. Qatar has pursued mediation, while Trump has acknowledged that Qatar and Saudi Arabia favour a peaceful settlement. Their interest is not merely to avoid further attacks. It is to preserve the conditions under which capital, shipping and ambitious economic programmes can operate. Sustained pressure might produce concessions from the Iranian government or buy time for negotiation. But if it lacks a credible diplomatic destination, it risks prolonging the uncertainty Gulf states are spending heavily to reduce. Washington can choose its pressure tactics; Gulf governments must continue making long-term economic decisions regardless. Any assessment of Trump’s third way should ask not only whether it changes Tehran’s calculations, but whether it brings greater stability to the region and relief to the people living with the consequences.